Abstract. An important question in the dynamic European wholesale markets for electricity is whether to define the geographical market at the level of an individual member state or more broadly. We show that if we currently take the traditional approach by considering for each member state whether there is one single other country that provides a substitute for domestic production, the market in each separate member state has still to be considered a separate market. However, if we allow for the possibility that at different moments in time there is another country that provides a substitute for domestic production, then the conclusion should be that certain member states do not constitute a separate geographical market. This is in particular true for Belgium, but also for The Netherlands, France, and to some extent also for Germany and Austria. We call this alternative approach the "and/or" approach.
Introduction
Electricity markets in Europe are undergoing important changes, mainly because of the attempt of the European Commission to create one, large European market that is liberalized and free of excessive regulation. An important step in the process of creating one European market is the construction of much larger interconnection capacities to trade electricity across borders of different member states.
1 In reaction to these policy developments, the industry is in a process of restructuring and relatively many mergers and acquisitions are taken place.
National competition authorities and regulators are faced with the question how to evaluate these activities. A first, important step in these evaluations is to assess the relevant product market. At a retail level, it seems by and large clear that the relevant market is not larger than the national level. At the wholesale level, however, this is less clear. In this paper we address the question how to define wholesale electricity markets in Europe. As explained above, this question is relevant to assess how successful the general policy of the European Commission is and also for evaluating an actual merger or acquisition proposal.
Relevant markets are typically defined by answering the question whether two individual products are substitutes for each other (EU, 1997) . If a competition authority concludes that no single product acts as a full substitute, then the product under consideration is considered to constitute its own relevant market and the HHI (or some alternative measure in the case of electricity markets, such as the Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI) or the Residual Supplier Index (RSI)) calculated in that market is considered to be a proper indication of whether that market is concentrated and a firm's market share in that market a proper indication of whether a firm has a dominant position. Electricity itself is, of course, a homogeneous good so that the question concerning the definition of the relevant market is mainly a question concerning the definition of the geographical market (and thus implicitly whether import capacity is such that electricity produced in neighboring countries can act as a substitute for domestically produced electricity in satisfying local demand).
Due to the arbitrage possibilities, electricity prices in the different countries should be identical if import capacity is abundant so that there is one geographical market. Even more, since November 21, 2006 the power exchanges of the Netherlands, Belgium and France are linked and the interconnection capacity is optimally used in the bidding process so that arbitrage possibilities between wholesale electricity prices in these three countries are automatically exploited if existing. Electricity prices can only be different across different neighboring countries if import capacity forms a bottleneck.
Due to the fact that electricity cannot be stored, there is also a time dimension in defining the market: the electricity market between 8 and 9 am, for example, is different from the market between 9 and 10 pm. Import capacity may be large enough in non-peak hours to be able to speak about one non-peak market that is larger than an individual country, but if the interconnection capacity is still too small in peak hours to be able to provide domestic users an alternative supply, then the conclusion may be that one should stick to a narrowly defined market (certainly for peak hours). This is especially the case as large firms may benefit greatly from a dominant position during peak hours. The fact that overall the different national electricity wholesale prices seem to be close to each other may not be enough reason for competition authorities to conclude that there is one (large) relevant market as market power (if existing) can imply very high profits in a relatively small time period.
In this paper we want to argue that the approach to defining the relevant geographical market by considering for each member state (and each hour) whether there is one single other country that provides a substitute for domestic production has important limitations. In particular, such an approach does not take into account the high volatility of demand and the technical limitations of the transmission network. Due to the non-storability of electric energy the size of the relevant market in the electricity sector (and the market by which it is constrained) changes from hour-to-hour. We show that if we currently take the traditional approach, the market in each separate member state has still to be considered a separate market. However, if we allow for the possibility that at a certain hour there is either one country or another country (or both or more) that provides a substitute for domestic production, then the conclusion should be that certain member states do not constitute a separate geographical market. This is in particular true for Belgium, but also for The Netherlands, France, and to some extent for Germany and Austria. In fact, one may argue that these countries are close to forming one large wholesale electricity market. In contrast, even if we use this "and/or" approach for countries like Italy, Spain and the Nordic countries, united in Nordpool, 2 the conclusion should be that they remain separate geographic markets.
It is clear that a firm producing electricity in country A is more constrained in its behavior by electricity producers in countries B and/or C than by producers in countries B only or C only.
How large the "and/or" effect is depends on the size of the different cross border interconnection capacities in relation to the size and form (nuclear, gas, coal) of domestic electricity demand and supply. We show that in comparison to other countries Belgium has a relatively large cross border interconnection capacity implying that the "and/or" effect in
Belgium should be larger than in neighboring countries. The analysis shows that the effect for
Belgium is so large that at any point in time, there is always at least one other country (most notably France and/or The Netherlands) that forms a competitive constraint on the Belgian wholesale market, even though the French and Dutch electricity production by itself cannot be considered a full substitute for electricity produced in Belgium as there are hours during the day where import capacity forms a bottleneck for an integrated market. This, of course, does not mean that we may never expect to observe high prices in the Belgian wholesale market.
However, when the Belgian wholesale prices are high the corresponding prices in France and/or The Netherlands are also high.
The definition of the relevant electricity market has important repercussion for how to consider firm conduct or possible (horizontal or vertical) mergers. If an individual country is the relevant product market, a firm that is mainly operating in the wholesale market of that country is much more likely to have a dominant position it could potentially exploit. On the other hand, if the geographical market is wider, the behavior of that company is constrained by foreign electricity producers.
As far as we know, this is the first article analyzing the issue of market definition by taking the possibility of a competitive constraint imposed by multiple alternative products (countries) into account. This "and/or" approach we argue fits well the "flighty" nature of electricity 3 Many papers analyze the price level itself as electricity has some characteristics that result in a different pricing behavior compared with other products (e.g. Knittel and Roberts, 2005 and Mount et al. 2006) . As long as electricity producers belong to the same market this literature does not interfere with our study. However, it might explain why prices in countries differ at some points of time.
hours were still present. Armstrong and Galli (2005) propose an alternative concentration measure that takes into account how often prices in two countries differ more than 5% from each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the methodology employed, the data used and some descriptive statistics. Section 3 gives the results and Section 4 concludes.
Methodology, data and descriptive statistics
As explained in the introduction, electricity prices vary by the hour as electricity is a nonstorable product. Daily per hour wholesale prices for the one-day-ahead market in Belgium, These descriptive statistics make two things very clear. First, from Figure 1 it is clear that in most countries there is a difference between peak hours and non-peak hours, with peak hours being defined as the 9 th till the 20 th hour. plays also some role in the details of the interpretation of our results in the next Section.
Moreover, we can already see from Figure 1 that the electricity prices in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands are somewhat grouped together and distinct from the lower prices in the Nordic countries, Spain and Poland and the markedly higher prices in
Italy. Second, in Figures 2a and 2b , we have depicted a typical time series of one peak and one non-peak hour as a function of time. From the Figures it is clear that there is much more variation in the peak hour series than in the non-peak hour series. 8 Moreover, the two pictures convey the idea that the time series we are dealing with are stationary. If we want to be justified in simply regressing hourly wholesale electricity prices in one country on (composite) hourly wholesale electricity prices of (a set of) other countries using OLS, then we should exclude the possibility of the time series being non-stationary. We formally test for stationarity using
, where t y is the price of wholesale electricity in a certain country and a certain hour at day t and γ and φ are parameters to be estimated, and show, using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (see, e.g., Greene, 2000) , that we can reject the hypothesis that there is a unit root nearly in all cases. 9 Accordingly, we 8 To make the figures comparable, the horizontal axis has a maximal value of 200 euro per MW. For the 18 th hour some days show a higher price than this maximum. Note that price spikes are a regular phenomenon in electricity markets (Huisman and Mahieu, 2003) . 9 Only for Nordpool (hour 1 50 5 and 20 to 24) and POLPX (hours 2 and 3) we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis. We therefore also analyze whether our conclusions are robust for estimations in first differences.
subsequently perform the standard approach in the literature (e.g. Armstrong and Galli, 2005 and Zachman, 2005) and do a simple regression analysis of the form
where j t h P , are the price of wholesale electricity in country j at a certain hour h at day t and α and β are parameters to be estimated.
10 If the two countries have one fully integrated market, one should expect in equation (1) To test the idea that a competitive constraint is imposed by a combination of countries, but not by one country on its own, we perform a similar analysis but we replace the price of one other country as "explanatory" variable, by a composite variable (MIX), where for each day we take that observation from the set of observations for all other countries that is closest to the price observation of the country that needs to be explained. In the analysis presented here we have not restricted the composite variable to the neighboring countries of the country under 10 Including a trend in the estimations does not change our conclusions.
consideration. This is because, in principle, one could buy electricity in the wholesale market in any other country and buy the necessary interconnection capacity at an auction. This is, of course, more complicated for countries that are relatively far apart from each other, but not impossible both in theory and in practice. 11 This is particularly so for France and the Netherlands where the market connection that has been established in November 2006 makes importing and exporting between these two countries a lot easier. Of course, one already can get some idea whether prices are significantly similar to each other
by simply looking what percentage of the day's electricity prices in two countries differ less than 1% or 10% from each other or from the composite prices. These descriptive statistics for 11 As a robustness check, we have performed a similar analysis, but restricting the composite variable to the neighboring countries. This is of course, somewhat problematic also becauise we do not have data for neighboring countries that are not in the data set (this is of particular importance for Poland and Austria). The results of this analysis qualitatively support the conclusions we report here. Details can be obtained from the authors (or can be checked independently as all data sources are publicly available).
all countries are presented in Table 1a for a 1% difference and in Table 1b for a 10% difference. One explanation for this almost perfect fit between the Belgian electricity prices and the composite price of electricity prices is that the interconnection capacity, expressed as a percentage of the total nationwide available production capacity is indeed the highest in Belgium as described in Table 2b . 12 The same is true, but to a lesser extent, for The Netherlands, Germany, Austria and France. Table 2a gives the basic information about interconnection capacity between two countries. One can also see from both tables that for Poland (the country with the largest import capacity as a percentage of domestic production after these countries) most of the capacity comes from Germany and as German wholesale electricity prices are typically higher than the Polish prices, Germany does not impose much of a competitive constraint on Poland. 
Results
In this section we provide four sets of results. The first set of results concerns the preliminary test on the stationarity of the time series involved. As for most of the time series we can clearly reject the hypothesis that the time series are non-stationary, we subsequently simply perform OLS analyses of the relation (expressed in equation (1)) between wholesale electricity prices at individual power exchanges and corresponding prices in neighboring countries and then also between prices at individual power exchanges and corresponding composite prices. In these analyses, we take Belgium as a showcase as the results for that country in general, and the impact of our new approach in particular, are the starkest. The focus on one individual country also serves a didactical purpose of showing the details of the analysis. We also show the corresponding results for all countries in general overview tables.
Finally, we do a robustness check by presenting the results of the analysis in first differences.
Testing for non-stationarity (unit roots)
As described in the former section we test for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Table 3 presents the result for the hypothesis of a unit root in the electricity prices. This hypothesis is rejected for nearly all 24 hours. Only for NordPool (hour 1 to 5 and 20 to 24) and POLPX (hour 2 and 3) the test rejects a unit root. As already said, at the end of this Section we also analyze whether our conclusions are robust for estimations in first differences as a sensitivity analyses.
Individual country comparisons
We next present the results of the analysis where a country's wholesale price is explained in terms of the prices in one other country. We first focus on Belgian wholesale electricity prices and ask how these prices compare with similar prices in surrounding countries. In table 4 we present, we focus on the relation with France (as this is the strongest link) and in table 5 we also present the global results for all individual country comparisons. For every hour of the data, the analysis is based on estimating the coefficients of equation (1). Table 4 presents the estimation results for estimating equation (1) for every hour separately with French PWXT prices as explanatory variables and Belgian prices as the variable to be explained and we use a
Wald-test to test the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 0 and 1, respectively.
It becomes clear from reading the table that in almost all peak hours (except for hours 15, 16, 17 and 20) we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are indeed equal to 0 and 1 (what needs to be the case when markets are fully integrated). Although the coefficient for PWXT is always close to 1, the constant is often positive and significant implying a higher price level in Belgium compared to France. However, even when the hypothesis is not rejected the R 2 is not very close to 1 indicating that there is no perfect match between the prices in the two countries.
Moreover, we have also estimated the average price difference and it turns out that this average price difference can be larger in peak hours where the test result is positive than in non-peak hours where the test result shows that the two series are not identical. Economic significance (in terms of whether or not firms can gain significant profits because of price margins) is thus not identical to statistical significance. For instance, Table 4 shows that the average price difference in hour 1 is € 0.18 per MWh and a statistical test result indicating that the two series are not identical, whereas the average price difference in hour 17 is € 2.83 and a statistical test result indicating that the two series are identical. The reason for this is that the prices in non-peak hours are very stable (see Figure 2a in the previous section) so that small deviations may have a larger impact on the estimation results. Peak prices vary so much over time that relative small deviations do not impact on the estimated values of coefficients. This is reflected in the value of the R 2 , which is often lower in peak hours than in non-peak hours. Overall, we conclude from Table 4 that the wholesale electricity prices in Belgian and
France are somewhat close to each other on many moments, but that there are still some significant differences.
A similar conclusion, applies to a comparison of all other individual countries with respect to one another: these relationships are often less tight than the relationship between Belgian electricity prices and those in France; see Table 5 for details. Full integration is rejected for all country comparisons for nearly all hours. 13 Sometimes, however, price differences are very small in the majority of time periods. 
Comparing individual country prices with a composite price
Next, we present the results of a similar analysis as before, but now replacing individual country data by a composite price as explanatory variable, where this composite price is constructed out of the original individual country prices in such a way that at each time period the composite price is the individual country's price that is closest to the price of the country we with to investigate. As explained before, the idea behind this construction is that because of the homogeneity of electricity and the perfect arbitrage possibilities, electricity flows to wherever the price is lowest if there is sufficient interconnection capacity. So, in this way we can test whether there is any moment in time where an individual country's electricity prices are different from any of its neighboring countries. If not, then one can rightfully claim that the wholesale electricity market is always larger than the country itself. To show the results of this analysis, we again first concentrate on Belgium and report a full set of results for this country and then continue to report the overall results in a more summarizing fashion. Table 6 presents the following interesting results that come out of our analysis. At any moment in time the estimated slope β coefficient of Equation (1) is exactly equal to 1.00, whereas the estimated coefficient α coefficient of Equation (1) is close to 0.00 and the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0 cannot be rejected for almost any hour. Moreover, for every hour the R 2 is exactly equal to 1.00 (or just differs by less than 0.01). This means that two time series are really almost identical at any moment in time and the statistical Wald-test only rejects the hypothesis that the two series are identical in four of the non-peak hours 4, 5, 6 and 23 (but this is again due to the fact that the time series in these hours are very stable and that therefore any small difference clearly sticks out). Statistical significance in this case also coincides with economic significance: the average price difference in any hour is less than € 0.26 and for most hours it is clearly less than €0.10! We conclude from this that at any point in time there is no separate Belgian wholesale electricity market and that the market is always intimately connected to at least one other country and no electricity company can enjoy market power in a separate Belgian market.
It is of course important to know how the composite MIX index is composed. It turns out that the non-neighboring countries' prices are never used and German prices are almost never used as the basis for the composite price and that both the French and Dutch prices account for around 50% of the cases (see table 7 below). Therefore, Belgian electricity prices are intimately connected to the corresponding prices of these two neighboring countries.
We next present the results of the same analysis for the other countries to see whether the same result applies to other countries as well. Table 7 reports what the constituent parts for the composite mix price index are for each individual country. Table 8a reports the overall results for peak hours and table 8b presents the results for non-peak hours. Table 7 shows that for five countries in the dataset, the composite mix price index is mostly composed of the price data in the countries with which it is mostly integrated. For Belgium, these are exclusively France and the Netherlands, and for France and the Netherlands, these are mostly the other two countries for which the markets are coupled. For Austria and Germany most of the connections are with the former three countries and with each other. For the remaining countries the mix does not seem to follow a clear pattern.
Using these composite mixed variables, Tables 8a and 8b then provide the main results of our analysis. 14 Table 8a summarizes the main components of the regression results where individual country data for peak hours are explained in terms of the composite MIX data.
From the table it is clear that the French and Dutch wholesale electricity prices can be very 14 Full results are included in Appendix B.
well explained by the composite mix variable. The R 2 is typically very high, the percentage deviation from the mean is often less than 0.1% and even if convergence is formally rejected from a statistical point of view (which in the peak hours actually never happens for France), then the difference from the mean is still less than 1%. One can also clearly see that Austria and Germany are also quite well integrated with Belgium, France and the Netherlands, although the convergence is less strong for these two countries as it is for the former three countries. Given the market coupling of the wholesale prices in The Netherlands, France and Belgium this should not be very surprising. 15 It is clear that for the remaining countries, convergence does not obtain even if we consider the composite mix variable. Convergence is formally rejected for all hours (apart from 2 hours for Poland) and the percentage deviation from the mean can easily be more than 10%. The analysis in Table 8b for non-peak hours confirms the results for peak hours. Even though for some hours, the formal test of convergence is rejected for France and the Netherlands, the R 2 is typically 0.99 or higher and the percentage deviation from the mean is usually as small as 0.1%. Austria and Germany are also well integrated with at least one other country indicating that there is a group of roughly five countries that can be said to form the forefront of the integration of European wholesale electricity markets. Our methodology of looking at a composite index with which a country is integrated does not help for the remaining countries (Italy, Spain, Poland and the Scandinavian countries): even with the composite index, convergence should be rejected. . Where α and β are the estimated coefficients. 2. The letter R means rejected.
Analysis in first-differences
As a robustness check, we have also done a similar analysis using first-order differences rather than the original time series in absolute values. A first-order difference analysis is appropriate especially in case the time series are not stationary. Above, we have argued that the Dickey-Fuller test tells us that stationarity cannot be rejected for most time series.
Nevertheless, the analysis in first-order differences can be used as a robustness check. The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 9a and 9b. 16 Table 9 confirms the overall picture of Table 8 , but makes the distinction between the three groups of countries even more pronounced. For the Belgian market, there are now only two non-peak hours where the formal test of convergence is rejected and we therefore conclude that the Belgian market is almost fully integrated with the Dutch and French markets and this market should not be analyzed in isolation of other markets at any time of the day. Indeed, the R 2 is also 1.00 in the two cases where convergence is rejected. Also for France and The Netherlands, the conclusion is that almost at any hour there is another country that imposes a competitive constraint. For the important peak hours, this is true in all hours, apart from one for The Netherlands. The results for Austria and Germany show, however, that the case for convergence is more problematic than it seems to be the case for the analysis in absolute terms presented in Table 8 .
Convergence has to be rejected for almost all hours, especially for Austria. The results for the remaining countries confirm the idea that they are not integrated with the rest of Europe.
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that one has to be careful in defining electricity wholesale markets in Europe. Standard techniques of market definition suggest that the researcher investigates whether the conditions under which product B is provided impose a competitive constraint on the pricing behavior of firms producing product A. And similarly for products C, D, etc. If no such a product would impose a competitive constraint, then it is argued that product A is to be regarded as being in a separate market. If we would apply this line of argument to the European wholesale electricity market, one would conclude that each country constitutes its own separate market. Or, more precisely, there are significant parts of the day where the market in a country behaves differently from markets in each of its neighboring countries. If one takes into account the possibility that product B or C (at least one of them at each moment in time) impose a competitive constraint on the pricing behavior of firms 16 The absolute value of the average price difference as reported in Table 5 is not given in Table 6 as the average of the first difference is (nearly) zero in all cases.
producing product A, then our analysis clearly shows that Belgium should not be regarded as having a separate wholesale electricity market. The same conclusion applies, but a little less strongly, to France and The Netherlands. The results for Austria and Germany are more ambiguous and depend on whether the analysis is carried our in absolute numbers or in first differences. On the basis of our results one can conclude that the wholesale electricity markets of the countries that have coupled their markets (Belgium, France and The Netherlands)
should be considered as one and at the forefront of one European wholesale electricity market with Austria and Germany following at some distance.
Our analysis has thus two important conclusions. It points at a weakness of the standard approach towards market definition, especially when applied to wholesale electricity markets.
Our alternative is to take a mix of countries into account when considering whether these countries together can impose a competitive constraint. Moreover, at a more substantial level it argues that it is misleading to analyze the wholesale electricity market in quite a few individual member states (in particular Belgium and neighboring countries) as if it is a market that is separated from its neighbors. 
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